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The confused state of most state corporate merger statutes allows many 
intellectual property licenses to find their way into unintended hands by 
way of corporate merger, in spite of non-assignment clauses.  Clearly a 
detriment to licensors, corporate licensees too should be wary of depending 
upon the merger statute; a court ruling may not go their way.  The states 
must clean up their collective act and bring some much needed certainty to 
a highly unpredictable intersection of corporate and intellectual property 
law. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Creators of original works most often protected by copyright, patent, and trademark, allow others to 
use them by way of licensing agreements.  Many of these licenses contain clauses prohibiting the assignment 
of the license to others without the permission of the licensor.  However, inconsistency among the states has 
fostered continuing confusion regarding the efficacy of such clauses when confronted with the merger of 
parties.  Even within one jurisdiction, sparse and ambiguous rulings often result in inconsistency based on the 
type of merger involved: forward mergers may constitute an impermissible assignment, while reverse mergers 
do not.  Such uncertainty is conducive neither to sound business decisions nor to the secure licensing of 
rights; the states should move, as some already have, toward clarifying their merger statutes. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 Intellectual property rights, which initially lie with the creator of an original work, may be licensed to 
others by contract.  Publishers pay authors for the right to distribute the authors’ works; similarly, businesses 
pay inventors for the right to manufacture and sell products based on their inventions.  These rights are 
granted by way of a license on the original work in question.2 
¶3 A license is a contract whereby the holder of intellectual property rights grants permission for another 
party to make use of the work.   In exchange, the licensed party will furnish the rights holder with some 
consideration or royalty, usually either a fee or a per unit rate, or some combination thereof.3 
¶4 The licensee an inventor chooses to make use of his original work is often exceedingly important to a 
licensing arrangement.  Trade and service mark licensors, for example, will be very careful about who may be 
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allowed to offer goods and services to the public under the aegis of their mark; poor quality goods or services 
will damage the value of a mark, so a mark holder will want to be certain to retain power to vet licensees.  
Often this is accomplished by means of a non-assignment provision in the license agreement, forbidding the 
transfer of the license.  However, unless the provision expressly prohibits the license surviving a merger, a 
company which acquires a licensee via a merger may also succeed to the license agreement without the 
permission of the licensor.4 
STATE MERGER STATUTES 
¶5 While not an entirely settled question, assignment of patent and copyright licenses is generally held to 
be matter of Federal common law.5  However, whether a merger constitutes an assignment remains a matter 
of state law.6  The language of state merger statutes therefore determines the effect of mergers with respect to 
assignment of licenses and the states have taken various approaches to the problem of assignment via merger. 
¶6 While a number of states have adopted parts of the ABA Model Business Corporation Act (the 
“Model Act”) at various times, the “effect of merger” provision (currently §11.07) language has changed over 
the years.  In 1969, it stated that following a merger, the survivor  
shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights, privileges, immunities, 
and franchises . . . of each of the merging or consolidating corporations … 
and all and every other interest of or belonging to or due to each of the 
corporations so merged . . . shall be taken and deemed to be transferred to 
and vested in such single corporation without further act or deed.7   
¶7 Alabama and Ohio, for example, have adopted this language.8  
¶8 The approach of the California legislature is not far removed from that of the 1969 Model Act 
language.  The California statute reads:  “the surviving corporation shall succeed, without other transfer, to all 
the rights and property of each of the disappearing corporations.”9 
¶9 In 1984, the Model Act was revised, and the new provision employed substantially different 
language:  “all property owned by, and every contract right possessed by, each corporation or other entity that 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Id. at 297-98. 
4 Id. at 314-15. 
5 See Brandon M. Villery, The Transferability of Non-Exclusive Copyright Licenses:  A New Default Rule for 
Software in the Ninth Circuit?, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 153, 156-57 (1999). 
6 E.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979) (a patent license case); SQL 
Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. C-91-1079 MHP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21097 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991) (a 
copyright license case); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Demuth Glass Works, Inc., 19 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (a 
patent license case).  See also Villery, supra note 5, at 157; Elaine D. Ziff, The Effect of Corporate Acquisitions on 
the Target Company’s License Rights, 57 BUS. LAW. 767, 775 (2002) (Villery and Ziff agree that copyright licenses 
follow the rules for patent licenses). 
7 Mod. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 76(d) (1969) (includes modifications through 1981). 
8 Ala. Code § 10-2B-11.06  (2003); ORC Ann. 1701.82(3) (2003). 
9 Cal. Corp. Code § 11.07(a) (2003). 
merges into the survivor is vested in the survivor without reversion or impairment . . . .”10  The Delaware 
statute employs some of this latter language.11   
¶10 The official comment to Model Act §11.07 includes the following note:  “A merger is not a 
conveyance, transfer, or assignment.  It does not give rise to a claim that a contract with a party to the merger 
in effect on the grounds of non-assignability, unless the contract specifically provides that it does not survive 
a merger.”12 
¶11 In order to ensure the enforceability of this proviso, certain states have modified their statutory 
language.  Colorado’s statute states that following a merger the assets of the constituent corporations are 
“transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation.”13  This language was formerly employed by the Ohio 
statute, and was interpreted contrary to the official comment proviso, as will be discussed below.  To prevent 
this problem, Colorado has enacted a further provision explicitly providing that “a merger does not constitute 
a conveyance, transfer, or assignment.”14 
¶12 Similarly, until 1987, the Texas statute was nearly identical; the assets of constituent corporations 
were “deemed to be transferred to and vested in” the survivor.15  For the same reasons as Colorado, Texas 
amended its previous statute.16  The statute now provides that the assets of constituent corporations are 
“deemed to be, and without any transfer or assignment having occurred, vested in” the surviving 
corporation.17  A few states have thus taken steps to prevent the confusion that might arise following a 
merger.  Most effectively, states such as Colorado and Texas have amended their state statutes to expressly 
dictate that a merger does not constitute the assignment of a license. 
FORMS OF MERGER 
¶13 There are two common forms of merger, usually referred to as “forward” or “direct” mergers and 
“reverse triangular” or “reverse subsidiary” mergers.  The form employed in a given transaction can have a 
serious impact on the outcome in terms the transfer of license agreements.18 
¶14 In a forward merger, an acquired company ceases to exist as it is subsumed by the acquiring company 
or its subsidiary, which survives the merger.  The surviving company then succeeds, by operation of law, to 
the assets and liabilities of the subsumed corporation.19 
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¶15 By contrast, in a reverse triangular merger, the acquiring corporation sets up a subsidiary corporation.   
This subsidiary is then merged into the target company, which survives the merger, but which has traded its 
own stock for that of the subsumed subsidiary, so that the acquiring company now holds the target, which 
retains its assets, as a wholly-owned subsidiary.20 
¶16 Because the target company survives the merger, it has been assumed that such a merger does not fall 
prey to the uncertainty attending forward mergers with respect to assignments.  Indeed, in moving to amend 
its merger statute, the Texas legislature acted on the belief that reverse mergers were proof against questions 
of assignment, and therefore it was merely closing a loophole where one type of merger was open to contest 
but the other was not.21 
CASE LAW 
¶17 The case law22 touching on this question is particularly confusing, not least because the courts so 
often have deviated from what would appear to be an intuitive reading of the statutory language.  The 
revisions to the Model Act do not appear to have solved the problem; the “vested in” language contained in 
the 1984 Model Act has been repeatedly construed as denoting an assignment or transfer of contract rights 
from the constituent companies to the surviving company. 
¶18 As long ago as 1939, in Koppers Coal & Transport Co. v. United States,23 the Third Circuit 
confronted the Delaware statute, which then, as now, provided that when the merger is effected, “the separate 
existence of all the constituent corporations . . . shall cease” and that property “belonging to each [constituent 
corporation] shall be vested in the corporation resulting from or surviving” the merger.24  Faced with an 
argument that constituent corporations do not cease to exist, but rather live on within the surviving 
corporation, the court dismissed it as “metaphysical” and easily dispelled by the “vested in” language.25  “In 
short, the underlying property of the constituent corporations is transferred to the resultant corporation upon 
the carrying out of the . . . merger . . . .”26 
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¶19 Similar language is included in the Alabama “effect of merger” provision, derived from the Model 
Act.27  The Alabama statute explicitly states that “[w]hen a merger takes effect . . . [e]very other corporation 
party to the merger merges into the surviving corporation and the separate existence of every corporation 
except the surviving corporation ceases.”28  Nonetheless, in 1995 the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals 
accepted just such a “metaphysical” argument in International Paper Co. v. Broadhead.29    Though the new 
language had been adopted in the meantime, the court confirmed the continued validity of a 1974 ruling by 
the Alabama Supreme Court, which held that “[i]t is well-settled that the merger of two corporations does not 
end the existence of either, rather the existence of both continues under the merged status.”30  Therefore, since 
neither entity has ceased existence, no transfer or assignment is necessary; the contracting party continues to 
exist and to perform under the agreement.31 
¶20 Neither of these cases dealt specifically with licenses.  Koppers related to the transfer of stock shares, 
and International Paper to the survival of tax privileges.  However, the principles on which both cases were 
decided have heavily influenced license-related cases. 
PPG Industries:  Merger as Transfer 
¶21 In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp.,32 the Sixth Circuit addressed the transfer, via 
merger, of a patent license.  In spite of a clause in the license forbidding assignment, the licensee merged into 
another corporation, a competitor of the licensor.33  This surviving corporation then claimed it had not 
received the license via assignment, but rather had succeeded to them by virtue of the merger.34  The court 
noted that the chief precedent cited by scholars on this matter was Hartford-Empire Co. v. Demuth Glass 
Works, Inc.,35 which dealt with licenses which were explicitly assignable.36  Consequently, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that the conclusion reached in Hartford-Empire, that the licenses were “conveyed” under New York 
law to the survivor, owed to their explicit assignability, and not to “any general principle that such licenses 
pass to the resultant corporation where there is a merger.”37 
¶22 Though declining to apply the Hartford-Empire precedent, the Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that 
the licenses in PPG Industries were in fact transferred to the surviving corporation in violation of the non-
assignment clause.  Citing the Third Circuit ruling in Koppers, the PPG Industries court based its judgment 
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on an interpretation of the Ohio “effect of merger” statute.38  The Ohio statute at the time was based on the 
1969 Model Act and stated that all property of constituent corporations would “deemed to be [t]ransferred to 
and vested in the surviving or new corporation.”39  The Delaware statute construed by the Third Circuit in 
Koppers, by contrast, employs the language later adopted by the 1984 Model Act40, to wit, the property 
“belonging to each [constituent corporation] shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from 
such merger.”41  Nonetheless, the PPG Industries court, based on the language used by the Koppers court – 
“the underlying property of the constituent corporations is transferred to the resultant corporation”42 – deemed 
the Ohio statute to be semantically equivalent to the Delaware statute, and therefore the merger to have 
violated the non-assignment clause:  “A transfer is no less a transfer because it takes place by operation of law 
rather than by a particular act of the parties.”43 
¶23 This rationale has not been universally accepted.  The Texas legislature found it so disturbing that 
Texas legislators specifically cited it as a result the new statutory language was designed to prevent.44 
Trubowitch:  The Balance of Interest Test 
¶24 Courts, too, disapproved of the PPG Industries ruling.    Citing California Supreme Court Justice 
Traynor’s finding in Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co.45  that "if an assignment results merely from a 
change in the legal form of ownership of a business, its validity depends upon whether it affects the interests 
of the parties protected by the non-assignability of the contract,"46  in Syenergy Methods v. Kelly Energy 
Systems, Inc, the Rhode Island Federal District Court chose to qualify the PPG Industries decision.47 
¶25 Based on the fact that, in this particular case, the court could discern “no change in the protected 
interests of the parties” as a result of the merger, the Syenergy Methods court chose to accept that, while the 
merger might be seen in light of PPG Industries as effecting a transfer, it was not a transfer in violation of the 
non-assignment clauses:48  “Defendants cannot be permitted to dispute the terms of a legitimate agreement 
when no substantial basis exists for such a dispute.”49 
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¶26 However, the rationale adopted in Trubowitch received short shrift in Council of Better Business 
Bureaus Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, Inc.,50 a trademark license case. Though, as in Syenergy, there was no 
discernable prejudice to the rights of either party following the merger – both parties to the merger held 
licenses for the same trademark – the court, citing PPG Industries, refused to budge from a strict reading of 
the “explicit language” of the non-assignment clause.51 
¶27 The Trubowitch doctrine turns up again in SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp.52  However, in this 
case the federal court determined that the balance of interest test was unnecessary.53  Considering a software 
license dispute, the facts of which were remarkably similar to those in PPG Industries (a licensee merged 
with a competitor of the licensor; the license contained a non-assignment clause) the court, citing Trubowitch, 
held that “California courts have consistently recognized that an assignment or transfer of rights does occur 
through a change in the legal form of ownership of a business.”54  Citing Koppers, the court endorsed the 
proposition that “a transfer of rights is no less a transfer because it occurs by operation of law in a merger.”55  
Despite taking explicit note of Justice Traynor’s Trubowitch principle – that the validity of an assignment 
depends on its effect on the interest of the parties – the SQL Solutions court concludes that copyright licenses 
are not assignable as a matter of Federal law, and so the transfer, though it might otherwise survive an 
analysis under the Trubowitch test, is forbidden under Federal law.56 
The Reverse Triangular Merger Problem 
¶28 The SQL Solutions decision is notable for another reason.  Excepting Hartford-Empire, for which the 
record is unclear,57 all of the cases previously discussed involved forward mergers.  SQL Solutions involves a 
reverse triangular merger.58 
¶29 With respect to the Hartford-Empire decision, the PPG Industries opinion comments that “[i]t is also 
noteworthy that the surviving corporation following the merger in Hartford-Empire was the original licensee, 
whereas in the present case the original licensee was merged into [the survivor].”59  Furthermore, the Texas 
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(contending that the language of the PPG Industries opinion – the clause quoted immediately above in conjunction 
legislature, in amending the Texas statute in 1987, expressed the opinion that “a merger may now be effected 
without raising the issue [of assignment by merger] by means of a "reverse triangular merger."60  However, 
the SQL Solutions decision casts doubt on the certainty of this conclusion.  Although the court was 
undoubtedly aware of PPG Industries,61 it took no interest in the mechanics of the merger, concluding that 
under established California doctrine, an assignment occurs through a change in the legal form of ownership 
of a business.62  Evidently, a reverse triangular merger qualifies as a “change in the legal form of ownership,” 
under the doctrine of Trubowitch.  
TXO Production:  The Efficacy of the Texas Statute 
¶30 By deviating from the Model Act language, Texas has had better luck than many other states in 
drafting a statute sufficiently lucid on this point to make deviation by its courts practically impossible.  Its 
1987 revision was put to the test in 1999 in TXO Production Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc.63  Here, the Texas Court 
of Civil Appeals overturned a ruling by the trial court, which held that a nonassignable license to use 
proprietary data was improperly transferred by operation of a merger.64 
¶31 On appeal, the court considered the arguments favoring the precedent of PPG Industries but 
dismissed them on several grounds.65  First, the court held that PPG Industries is distinguishable from TXO 
Production because the former case involved a merger between unrelated entities, while the latter was 
between a parent and subsidiary, and therefore merely a change of form.66  Texas therefore seems not 
subscribe to Judge Traynor’s assertion that a change in the legal form of ownership of a corporation is 
sufficient to effect a transfer. 
¶32 Second, the court noted that Texas legislators, in promulgating the 1987 statute revision, had 
expressly named the ruling in PPG Industries as a result they were attempting to prevent.67  Third, the court 
observed that PPG Industries involved a patent license, and was based therefore in part on “a strong public 
policy against the implied assignment of patent licenses.”68  TXO Production, by contrast, involved a license 
to use data; the licensor attempted to argue that the data constituted a trade secret, and might therefore be 
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64 Id. at 143. 
65 Id. at 140-42. 
66 Id. at 141. 
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analogous to a patent license, but failed to convince the court.69  This third contention by the court seems 
distinctly questionable.  While the PPG Industries opinion does make mention of this federal policy, it notes 
that the district court had concluded that it was not germane to the case, since it needed first to determine, via 
state law, whether there had been a transfer.70  There is nothing to suggest that the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals took issue with this ruling by the trial court; its opinion appears to have been based on this 
determination, focusing on the mechanics of the merger under state law. 
¶33 Even so, the final distinction is the most significant.  The court concluded that the Texas, Ohio, and 
Delaware statutes, being all derived in some measure from the Model Act,71 are sufficiently similar to be 
interchangeable.72  Explicitly rejecting the conclusion reached in PPG Industries, it instead chose to 
reinterpret all three statutes, reading them - without explicit textual analysis - to result in the surviving 
corporation’s succession to the rights of the constituent corporations without a prohibited transfer.73 
CONCLUSION 
¶34 To feel secure in their rights, licensors must be able to make an accurate assessment of who may 
ultimately come into possession of the licenses they grant.  Careful drafting of license agreements – the 
inclusion of an explicit bar to mergers or, alternatively, explicit permission, in non-assignment clauses – is 
still the best way to prevent surprises like the sort seen above.  Many existing licenses, however, and no doubt 
many yet to come, do not contain clauses addressing this point.  It would behoove the states to make their 
merger statutes as pellucid as possible to avoid these problems. 
¶35 While direct textual analysis of the Texas statute is absent from the opinion in TXO Production, 
Texas’s adoption of a provision explicitly barring mergers from being interpreted as assignments has clearly 
shown the benefits to be gained by enactment of much-needed legislative guidance.  California’s more 
ambiguous language seems to have been almost entirely ignored by the courts, as evidenced by the opinion in 
SQL Solutions.  Worst of all, the language of the current Model Act, as embodied in Delaware’s statute, has 
been the most inconsistently interpreted of all. 
¶36 The explicit statement included in the official comment to the Model Act is obviously not effective 
unless, as Texas has done, it is included within the body of the statute.  Other states, especially those 
employing the “vested in” language of the current Model Act, and most especially Delaware and New York, 
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the main centers of American corporate law and practice, must seriously consider  following Texas and 
adopting the comment language into the text of their statutes. 
¶37 These states need not adopt Texas’s stance on assignment.  It will suffice if they dictate the 
alternative:  that a merger is an assignment.  However, the situation can only be improved by shedding some 
legislative light on this very murky corner of jurisprudence where fundamental principles of intellectual 
property protection merge with increasingly important trends in corporate law.  
